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Abstract – This paper provides evidence on the corporate governance role of shareholder-
initiated proxy proposals. Previous studies debate over whether activists use proxy proposals to 
discipline firms or to simply advance their self-serving agendas, and whether proxy proposals are 
effective at all in addressing governance concerns. Using the largest sample yet examined as well 
as extensive controls for governance quality, we find that activists use the proxy process as a 
disciplinary mechanism, and as such are valuable monitoring agents. Moreover, proposal 
announcements in the proxy statements have positive tock price effects, and both the market and 
the voting shareholders respond as much to the target firm’s governance quality as to the 
proposal’s objective and sponsoring shareholder. We address the endogeneity of target selection 
and proposal success using sample selection models. W  conclude that shareholder proposals 
have nontrivial control benefits, countering arguments that they should be restricted by the SEC. 
Keywords: Shareholder activism, shareholder proposals, corporate governance, sample selection. 
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Shareholder activism through the proxy process has been subject to intense academic debate in 
recent years. Bebchuk (2005) is a strong advocate of shareholder participation in corporate 
governance, and argues that shareholder-initiated proxy proposals are a useful and relevant means 
of countering managerial agency problems. This assertion is supported by Harris and Raviv’s 
(2008) recent theoretical model, which shows that in firms where agency concerns are 
exacerbated, it is optimal that shareholders seek control over corporate decisions. Other studies 
are nonetheless very vocal in questioning the actual ontrol benefits of shareholder proposals. 
Prevost and Rao (2000) suggest that they are often pr ceded by failed behind-the-scenes 
negotiations with management, and may exert no discipline anyhow due to their nonbinding 
nature. Legal scholars argue that the proposal sponsors themselves are likely to pursue their self-
serving agendas or be simply too uninformed to make eff ctive governance decisions, with 
Bainbridge (2006) going as far as inferring that proposal submissions should be restricted by the 
SEC. 
The empirical literature, summarized by Black (1998), Karpoff (2001), and Gillan and Starks 
(2007), is indeed inconclusive about whether sharehold r proposals play a meaningful role in 
corporate governance. Recent research shows that the negative publicity and other reputational 
penalties indeed wield pressure on the target firms, because proposals that win a majority vote are 
likely to be implemented (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben, 2008). 
However, it remains unclear whether the proponent shareholders have the “correct” objective of 
disciplining management, or otherwise use the proxy process effectively. On one hand, the target 
firms tend to be poorly performing, but there is no evidence that they have poor governance 
structures such as heavily entrenched managers (Akyol and Carroll, 2006) or ineffective boards 
(Choi, 2001). On the other, there is no indication that proposal submissions have positive 
valuation effects, with some papers reporting outrigh  negative stock price reactions to the 
takeover-related proposals that typically attract the most voting support (Bizjak and Marquette, 
1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). 
This paper offers new evidence on the corporate govrnance role of shareholder proposals by 
simultaneously investigating (i) the selection of target firms, (ii) the stock price effects of 
proposal announcements, and (iii) the subsequent voting outcomes. Using 2,800 proposals 
submitted between 1996 and 2005, a sample of 2,000 target and nontarget firms, as well as 
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extensive controls for governance quality, we make several contributions to the literature. First, 
we show that shareholder proposals tend to be carefully targeted at firms that both underperform 
and have generally poor governance structures. We find that regardless of their objective, 
proposals are more likely to be submitted against firms that (i) use antitakeover provisions to 
entrench management, (ii) have ineffective boards, and (iii) have ill-incentivized CEOs. The 
probability of proposal submissions also decreases in leverage, which Jensen (1986) views as a 
remedy for free cash flow concerns. These results imply that activists use the proxy process as a 
disciplinary mechanism, and as such are valuable monitoring agents. 
Second, we find that proposal announcements in the proxy statements are actually met with 
significantly positive stock price reactions. While the voting outcomes improve persistently over 
time, the abnormal stock returns are highest during stock market runups and heightened takeover 
activity. Nonetheless, the two measures of proposal success coincide in two key aspects. On one 
hand, they are sensitive to the proposal’s objectiv and sponsoring shareholder, and are highest 
for proposals that are takeover-related or sponsored by public pension funds. On the other, they 
strongly depend on the target firm’s governance quality, and especially its use of antitakeover 
devices, despite the careful target selection process. These findings show that shareholder 
proposals are attributed nontrivial control benefits by both the market and the voting 
shareholders, especially as an alternative agency mechanism when the market for corporate 
control can no longer exert discipline. 
And third, this is the first study in the literature to analyze target selection and proposal 
success using sample selection models. Previous studie  perform separate regressions to 
determine why firms get targeted with proxy proposals, nd what drives proposal success in 
terms of the voting results and stock price effects. However, activists should consider the 
potential outcome before deciding whether or not to submit proxy proposals, while the voting 
shareholders and the market may respond to the act of the submission beyond the objective of the 
proposal itself. The sample selection framework confirms that target selection and voting success 
are endogenous, with independent analysis of the latt r producing somewhat biased parameter 
estimates. 
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the corporate governance rol of shareholder proposals. Our sample is 
described in Section 3 with a detailed discussion of recent trends in shareholders’ use of the 
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proxy process. The results of the sample selection m dels are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
finally allows for some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The literature on shareholder-initiated proxy proposals 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Gillan and Starks (2007) place shareholder activism on a continuum of responses that dissatisfied 
investors can give to corporate governance concerns. At one extreme of the continuum, 
shareholders can simply vote with their feet by selling their shares (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 
2003). At the other extreme is the market for corporate control, where investors initiate takeovers 
and buyouts to bring about fundamental corporate changes (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The role of 
shareholder activism arises when shareholders continue to hold their shares and seek to induce 
changes within the firm without a change in control. These investors may then press for corporate 
reforms by negotiating with management behind the scenes, or – especially when management is 
unresponsive – by submitting proxy proposals for share older vote. 
While shareholder proposals are generally considered to be relatively weak as a disciplinary 
mechanism, it has been widely debated whether they have any control benefits at all. Bebchuk 
(2005) advocates shareholder participation in corporate governance, and attributes shareholder 
proposals a meaningful role in mitigating the agency problems associated with managerial 
decisions. This assertion is supported by Harris and Raviv’s (2008) theoretical model. The model 
shows that in firms where managerial agency concerns a e exacerbated, it is optimal that activist 
shareholders seek control over corporate decisions, whether or not they are at an informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis management, or they are motivated by personal agendas rather than the 
maximization of firm value. 
Other studies conversely argue that proposal submission  have little use as an agency control 
device, and may actually have negative implications from a corporate governance perspective. 
Prevost and Rao (2000) point out that many institutional activists first try to negotiate with 
management behind the scenes, and only submit proxy proposals as a last resort. In their 
interpretation, the market may respond negatively to proposal submissions, to the extent that they 
signal management’s reluctance to negotiate even with significant shareholders who can build 
strong voting coalitions. The authors add that share older proposals may well be ineffective 
anyhow in disciplining management, because they are nonbinding under the SEC’s Rule 14a-8. 
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The main argument offered against shareholder proposals, which Harris and Raviv (2008) 
seek to address, is that the proposal sponsors themselves may be beset with conflict of interest 
motivations, or be simply too uninformed to make effective decisions on corporate governance. 
Public pension funds are often praised for their advocacy of shareholder interests, but Woidtke 
(2002) argues that political and social influences may divert their focus from disciplining 
management and maximizing firm value. More explicit are Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2009) in 
pointing out that union pension funds may use the proxy process to achieve their self-serving 
agendas, pointing to their role in the collective bargaining process and their other political 
interests. In the legal literature, Lipton (2002), Bainbridge (2006) and Stout (2007) use similar 
lines of reasoning to challenge Bebchuk’s (2005) advocacy of shareholder participation. 
Bainbridge (2006) goes as far as claiming that shareholders’ use of the proxy process can outright 
damage the firm by disrupting the decision-making authority of the board of directors, and infers 
that the SEC should consider raising the hurdles for pr posal submissions. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
Whether shareholder proposals have meaningful control benefits is indeed unclear from the 
empirical literature, summarized by the surveys of Black (1998), Karpoff (2001), and Gillan and 
Starks (2007). Recent studies confirm that they do exert pressure on the target firms despite their 
nonbinding nature, because as much as 40% of the proposals that win a majority vote end up 
being implemented (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Martin and Thomas, 1999; Thomas and Cotter, 
2007; Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben, 2008). Targets that ignore the shareholder vote have been 
shown to draw negative press, receive downgrades by governance rating firms, or end up on 
CalPERS’s “focus list” of poor financial and governance performers. Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben 
(2008) also show that their directors become less likely to be reelected and more likely to lose 
other directorships, in many cases due to dissatisfied activists targeting director elections with 
“just vote no” campaigns (Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 2008). 
Despite these key results, the literature remains inconclusive on whether the activists 
sponsoring proxy proposals actually have the “correct” incentive of disciplining management. 
Previous studies report that proposal sponsors are mo likely to target large, poorly performing 
firms (Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996; Martin and Thomas, 1999). Smith (1996) finds 
that they also consider the voting shareholders, to the extent that targets tend to have high 
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institutional and low insider ownership. There is no evidence however that agency concerns in 
the target firms are otherwise exacerbated by poor g vernance structures. Choi (2001) and Akyol 
and Carroll (2006) examine whether the selection of target firms is affected by governance 
considerations, and respectively find that the targets have neither inefficient boards nor managers 
heavily entrenched by antitakeover provisions. 
The literature also offers mixed results on whether t  target firm’s governance quality is 
observed by the voting shareholders. Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2008) recently find that 
proposals are more likely to win majority support if the target management is entrenched. 
However, Gordon and Pound (1993) and Bizjak and Marquette (1998) detect no evidence that 
voting success is affected by the target’s use of antitakeover devices or board effectiveness. 
Gillan and Starks (2007) argue that the voting results are mostly driven by the proposal’s 
objective and the sponsoring shareholder, and have istorically been strongest for proposals 
targeting antitakeover devices and sponsored by institutional investors. Cremers and Romano 
(2007) show that the identity of the voting shareholders is also relevant. On one hand, voting 
support increases in institutional ownership but decreases in ownership by managers, directors, 
and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP). On the other, ownership by insurance companies 
and banks’ trust departments increases voting support to a lesser extent than that by other 
institutional investors. These institutions are notably absent from the activist arena as well, and 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) and Pound (1988) rega d them as being pressure-sensitive due 
to their existing or potential business relationship  with the firms they invest in1. Pension funds, 
investment funds, and independent investment advisors are deemed to be pressure-insensitive in 
comparison, because they are less likely to have such b siness ties and thus should be more 
willing to challenge management over governance concerns2.  
Previous studies argue that the stock price effects of hareholder proposals should be 
examined around the dates the proxy statements are m il d, because the market should have 
                                                  
1 That such conflicts of interest may affect the share older vote on proxy proposals has long been voiced by activist 
investors, and eventually prompted the SEC’s mutual fund proxy vote disclosure rule in June 2003. Whether he rule 
has reduced conflicted voting remains debated. Creme s and Romano (2007) suggest that the extent of conflicted 
voting may actually have been exaggerated in the first place. 
2 Accordingly, greater ownership by pressure-insensitive nvestors has been associated with greater emphasis on pay 
for performance (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005), better acquisition decisions (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007), 
and better overall financial performance (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian, 2007). 
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reasonable expectations on whether a proposal passes or later becomes implemented (Bhagat, 
1983; Bhagat and Brickley, 1984), and there is otherwise no systematic market response to proxy 
releases that do not contain shareholder proposals (Brickley, 1986). Nonetheless, Gillan and 
Starks (2000) note that the stock price reactions to proposal announcements may not be 
significant because they are difficult to ascertain. First, the proxies often contain multiple 
proposals submitted by both shareholders and management, as well as disclose other important 
information. Second, information leakages may occur, for example when institutional proposal 
sponsors announce their projected targets for the imp nding proxy season. 
Previous event studies indeed do little in the way of showing that the market recognizes 
shareholder proposals as a relevant control mechanism. Most papers find insignificant market 
reactions to proposal announcements (Karpoff, Malatest , and Walkling, 1996; Smith, 1996; 
Wahal, 1996; Thomas and Cotter, 2007), while others r port outright negative abnormal stock 
returns for proposals targeting poison pills (Bizjak nd Marquette, 1998; Del Guercio and 
Hawkins, 1999; Prevost and Rao, 2000). Moreover, Gillan and Starks (2000) find some evidence 
for Prevost and Rao’s (2000) signaling hypothesis. The authors compare submissions made by 
institutional activists and by individual investors who are less likely to first negotiate with 
management, and find that the abnormal returns in the former case are lower and mostly negative. 
Other results nonetheless suggest that the market attributes at least some control benefits to 
the shareholder proposals that are the most likely to pass. The literature reports no evidence that 
the market responds better to submissions made against firms with poor governance structures. 
However, Gillan and Starks (2000) find that like th voting outcomes, the abnormal returns are 
higher for poorly performing targets with high institutional ownership. Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
Harman, and Parrino (2006) further analyze this latter result for takeover-related proposals, and 
find that the returns are only related positively to ownership by pressure-insensitive institutions. 
Finally, Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2009) examine union-sponsored proxy proposals, and find 
positive market reactions to those submitted against firms with one or more unions present.  
 
3. Sample description 
The shareholder proposals examined in this paper are all related to corporate governance and 
were submitted in the period between 1996 and 2005. Our data set contains 2,792 proposals 
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submitted at 646 firms with single class common stock3. Of these, 2,651 were taken from the 
RiskMetrics’ (formerly IRRC) database of proxy voting, which tracks over 1,900 firms including 
the Standard & Poor’s 1500. The remaining proposals were obtained from the proxy firm 
Georgeson Shareholder Communications, or hand-collected from the proxy statements of the 
firms tracked by RiskMetrics. 
We used the proxy statements, available through the SEC’s EDGAR database, to collect 
missing data and correct any errors in the RiskMetrics data set. For about half of the proposals 
RiskMetrics did not report the detailed three-way voting outcomes, and there were a number of 
inconsistencies in the treatment of broker nonvotes. In some cases, the proposal type and the 
identity of the proposal sponsor were missing or classified incorrectly. As the proxy mailing dates 
were not included in the RiskMetrics database, these were also collected from EDGAR. 
 
3.1 Proposal sponsors 
Table 1 stratifies the sample proposals by the yearof submission and the identity of the proposal 
sponsor. The sponsors are classified into six mutually exclusive categories: (i) union pension 
funds, (ii) public pension funds, (iii) investment funds, (iv) coordinated investor groups, (v) 
socially responsible and religious investors, and (vi) individual investors.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 shows that institutional activism through the proxy process has come to be heavily 
dominated by union pension funds. Gillan and Starts (2000) report 119 union-sponsored 
proposals for the entire period between 1987 and 1994. In contrast, there were 926 submissions 
made during our sample period, and as many as 559 between 2003 and 2005. That union pension 
funds are also very innovative in using the proxy process, as well as the media, in targeting 
management is discussed by Schwab and Thomas (1998) and Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2009). 
Public pension funds and investment funds submitted 136 and 62 proposals, respectively, 
between 1996 and 2005. Public pension funds were the most prolific institutional proposal 
sponsors until the early 1990s, when they began focusing on behind-the-scenes negotiations with 
                                                  
3 Dual class firms were omitted because their governance structures are difficult to compare with those f single 
class firms due to extensive voting and ownership differences. We omitted a total of 269 proposals submitted at 65 
dual class firms, representing about 9% of the initial sample. 
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management and targeting firms through the media (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; 
English, Smythe, and McNeil, 2004; Wu, 2004; Nelson, 2006)4. Hedge funds and other 
investment funds have historically been better know to rely on controversial activist strategies, 
whereby they take large positions in underperforming f rms and target management directly as 
per the agendas presented in their purpose statemens (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; 
Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2009; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009)5. 
Coordinated investor groups such as the now-defunct Investor Rights Association of America 
(IRAA) sponsored 197 proposals6, while socially responsible and religious investor made 121 
submissions targeting corporate governance issues. 
The remaining 1350 proxy proposals were submitted by individual investors, who dominated 
the proxy process almost entirely until the emergence of institutional activists in the mid-1980s. 
The most prominent proposal sponsors, often referred to as “gadfly” investors, have been active 
for many years, and include Evelyn Y. Davis and the C vedden, Rossi and Gilbert families, who 
submitted a total of 681 proposals over the sample period. 
 
3.2 Issues addressed 
Table 2 groups the sample proposals by the year of submission and the issue addressed. The 
issues are categorized by whether the proposal concerns (i) antitakeover devices, (ii) the board of 
directors, (ii) voting rules, (iv) executive compensation, (v) the sale of the target firm (vi) audit 
services, (vii) routine issues related to the annual meeting, or (viii) other miscellaneous issues. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The table shows that, as has been the case historically, antitakeover devices were the most 
frequent targets of the sample proposals. A total of 981 proposals were takeover-related, directed 
                                                  
4 Public pension funds began having more direct dialogue with management after the SEC passed new rules allowing 
shareholders to directly communicate with each other in 1992. This reduced the cost of creating shareholder 
coalitions and made the sponsoring of proxy proposals comparatively more expensive. 
5 Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) are the first to provide non-US evidence on hedge fund activism, by 
examining the activities of the Hermes Focus Fund in the UK. 
6 The Investor Rights Association of America (IRAA) was a spin-off of the United Shareholders Association (USA), 
active until the early 1990s. The IRAA disbanded in 1998, but its founding members continued to make proposal 
submissions (Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner, 1996). 
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primarily at the removal of classified boards (440), poison pills (312), and golden parachutes 
(129). Activists targeted poison pills particularly intensely after 2000, coinciding with the stock 
market downturn and the exacerbation of corporate governance concerns as a result of the Enron 
and subsequent accounting scandals. The incidence of submissions on board and voting-related 
issues remained relatively stable over the sample period, with a total of 495 and 354 proposals, 
respectively. Nonetheless, the number of proposals c lling for the independence of the board 
chairman and the election of board members by majority vote rose considerably in the 2000s. 
Between 1996 and 2005, shareholders sponsored 608 proposals on managerial compensation, 
more than double the 247 reported for 1987-1994 by Gillian and Starks (2000). Two thirds of 
these proposals were submitted after 2002, reflecting exacerbated concerns over the size, 
performance sensitivity, and expensing of pay packages. The crisis of confidence triggered by the 
Enron scandal also prompted a surge in the number of proposals targeted at audit issues, with 64 
of the 70 audit-related proposals submitted after 2001. Submissions seeking the sale of the target 
firm soared during the stock market runup of the lat 1990s, but fell significantly thereafter. 
Though not reported in Table 2, the surge in the number of takeover- and compensation-
related proposal submissions was largely driven by union pension funds. Antitakeover devices 
and board-related issues were targeted by most institutional proposal sponsors. However, unions 
also engaged firms over managerial compensation, with strong emphasis on stock option 
expensing and the granting of performance-based options and restricted shares. Hedge funds and 
coordinated investors submitted most proposals calling for the sale of the target firm. 
The proposals sponsored by individuals were by far the most diverse in terms of their policy 
objectives. Many activists tended to concentrate on a few select issues. For example, Evelyn Y. 
Davis sponsored 42 of the 45 proposals on compensatio  disclosure, 39 of the 47 proposals on 
director tenure, and 28 of the 35 routine proposals on the date and location of the annual meeting. 
Davis and the Gilbert brothers sponsored 161 of the 221 submissions on cumulative voting, while 
151 of the 312 poison pill proposals were submitted by the Chevedden and Rossi families. 
 
3.3 Voting outcomes 
Table 3 summarizes the voting outcomes on the sample proposals by the issue addressed, the year 
of submission, and the identity of the proposal spon or. The three-way voting results are 
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available for 2726 of the 2792 proposals; the remaining submissions also went to shareholder 
vote, but the results were not reported in detail by the target firms7. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the voting support attracted by shareholder proposals 
increased significantly during the sample period. The percentage of votes cast in favor was 32.9% 
on average, rising from 28.7% in 1996 to 37.1% in 2005. An improvement in the voting 
outcomes was apparent after 2001, coinciding with the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, and 
the introduction of the SEC’s mutual fund proxy vote disclosure rule in June 2003. Nonetheless, 
Gillan and Starks (2007) point out that the voting success of shareholder proposals has grown 
persistently since the mid-1980s, largely due to the ongoing rise of institutional equity ownership.  
The panel shows that the proposals targeting antitakeover devices achieved by far the most 
voting support at an average 53.4% of the votes cast. In fact, nearly two thirds of these proposals 
passed the shareholder vote, and as many as 84% received majority support in 2005. The voting 
results were uniformly strong for each provision targeted. The exception were the mostly union-
sponsored submissions calling for the target firm’s reincorporation, typically in Delaware, with 
16.9% of the votes cast in favor on average. 
The proposals targeting voting rules and managerial compensation won an average 32.3% 
and 21.5% of the votes, respectively. Of the voting-related proposals, those seeking confidential 
voting received 45.5% of the votes and passed in a third of the cases. The most successful 
compensation-related proposals called for greater sha eholder control over the approval of pay 
packages, or concerned the pay-performance sensitivity and accounting treatment of stock-based 
compensation. Standing out among these were the mostly union-sponsored proposals calling for 
the expensing of stock options, with won 49.0% of the votes and passed in half of the cases. The 
board-related proposals received 19.3% of the votes n average, and were most successful when 
seeking greater board independence. The proposals directed at audit and routine issues, as well as 
those seeking the sale of the target firm won modest voting support. 
                                                  
7 Proposals are sometimes withdrawn because the sponsor has negotiated a satisfactory resolution, or the SEC has 
allowed the firm to exclude it from its ballot due to the improper subject matter or technical reasons. Ri kMetrics 
does not include withdrawn proposals in its database. 
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Panel B of Table 3 shows how the identity of the proposal sponsor affected the voting 
outcomes. The takeover-related proposals performed w ll irrespective of the sponsoring 
shareholder. Otherwise, public pension funds and investment funds were the most successful in 
building voting support, with an average 43.0% and 41.0% of the votes, respectively. Union 
pension funds won an average 34.8% of the votes, which seems to reflect shareholder concerns 
over their political or social agendas. The percentage votes achieved by coordinated investor 
groups and socially responsible and religious investors were 28.6% and 23.7%, respectively. 
Finally, individual activists attracted an average 32.1% of votes cast, considerably more than the 
18.7% reported for 1987-1994 by Gillan and Starks (2000). Indeed, several “gadfly” investors 
popular in the business media have recently done very w ll in gathering voting support, with the 
Chevedden and Rossi families achieving particularly st ong outcomes. 
 
3.4 Stock price effects 
To measure the valuation effects of the sample proposals, we calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around the dates the proxy statements were mailed. The CARs are calculated 
using the market model methodology. The model parameters are estimated over the 200-day 
period ending 21 days before the proxy mailing dates, using the CRSP equal-weighted index. Of 
the 1756 initial proxy mailing dates, these parameters are available for 1739 events. The 
significance of the CARs is tested using Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen’s (1991) standardized 
cross-sectional Z-test and Cowan’s (1992) nonparametric generalized sign test. 
Table 4 reports the CARs across a number of event windo s. Remarkably, we find that the 
proposals were met with significantly positive market reactions upon their disclosure in the proxy 
statements. The CARs are significant in each event wi dow, with the mean and median [-1,+1] 
CAR at 0.25% and 0.02%, respectively. These results are fully robust to alternative specifications 
of the market model, implying that the market does attribute control benefits to proxy proposals8. 
                                                  
8 The CARs are fully robust to the use of postevent estimation periods in the market model. We estimated th  model 
parameters over the 200-day period beginning 21 and 42 ays after the proxy mailing date. In each case the [-1,+1] 
CARs had a mean of 0.27% and median of 0.07%, and the Z-test and the generalized sign test were significa t at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. The results are similarly robust to the use of the CRSP value-weighted index and the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, with the mean [-1,+1] CAR at 0.26% and 0.23%, respectively. In line with Brickley 
(1986), we find no systematic stock price reactions t  the proxy releases of nontarget firms. 
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That the CARs are modest in size is not surprising. On one hand, Gillan and Starks (2000) argue 
that proxy proposals induce smaller and more specific improvements in corporate governance 
than do alternative control mechanism such as takeovers. On the other, Section 2.2 discussed that 
we can only measure the stock price reactions to the proxies rather than the individual proposals, 
which should clearly lead to a downward bias in the siz  and significance of the results. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Table 5 partitions the mean [-1,+1] CARs by the year of submission, the issue addressed, and 
the identity of the proposal sponsor. Panel A shows that corresponding to the voting outcomes, 
the proxies containing takeover-related proposals hd by far the strongest stock price effects, at a 
mean and median of 0.44% and 0.13%, respectively. However, the CARs did not improve over 
time, but were most significant during the stock market runups and heightened takeover activity 
of 2000 and 2005. This implies that the control benefits of proxy proposals are most valuable 
when they help expose the target to an active market for corporate control. Shareholders may 
simply anticipate a higher premium paid in the event of a takeover bid (Cremers, Nair, and John, 
2009). However, the greater takeover threat should also induce greater improvements in 
corporate governance, to the extent that it exacerbt s pressure on the incumbent management. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that of the sponsoring shareholders, public pension funds achieved 
by far the strongest stock price effects with their proposal submissions. The CARs for the proxies 
containing their proposals were significant both stati ically and economically, with a mean and 
median at 1.08% and 0.53%, respectively. The union-sponsored proposals also induced small 
price gains of an average 0.16%. The stock price effects were insignificant for the other sponsor 
types, but the mean CAR was highest for hedge funds and other investment funds, at 0.53%. 
These findings are broadly in line with the superior v ting outcomes achieved by institutional 
proposal sponsors. At the same time, they are clearly inconsistent with Prevost and Rao’s (2000) 
hypothesis that the market responds less positively to institutional proposal submissions that are 




4. Multivariate analysis of target selection and proposal success 
To shed further light on the control benefits of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals, we now 
perform a multivariate analysis of (i) how the proposal sponsors select their targets, and (ii) what 
drives proposal success in terms of the voting results and stock price effects. To identify the firm 
characteristics that drive target selection and proposal success, we use a comprehensive set of 
accounting, market performance, ownership, and governance data collected from Compustat, 
CRSP, Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum, RiskMetrics, and ExecuComp. The analysis of target 
selection includes the entire universe of firms tracked by these databases between 1996 and 2005. 
This encompasses coverage of 1,961 NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ-listed firms across 10,590 
firm-years, of which 550 were targeted by proxy proposals across 1,494 firm-years. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics on target versus nontarget firms 
Table 6 compares the descriptive statistics on the target versus nontarget firms, with the variable 
descriptions provided in Appendix A. The difference-in-means t-tests assume unequal variances 
between the groups when the tests of equal variances ar  rejected at the 10% level. The 
significance of the differences in the medians is ba ed on Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Panel A of Table 6 shows how the targets and nontarge s compared in terms of their financial 
characteristics, market performance, and institutional ownership. Fama and French’s (2001) 
agency proxies show mixed evidence that governance concerns in the targets were exacerbated. 
The targets tended to be larger than the nontargets, wi h assets of $46.5 billion versus $7.3 
billion, respectively. However, there is no evidenc that they had lower debt-to-equity or market-
to-book ratios, which Fama and French (2001) regard as being inversely related to agency 
problems. The performance data confirm that the targe s performed poorly in the year up to two 
months before the proxy mailing dates. Their stocks delivered an average raw return of 14.5%, 
and underperformed the CRSP equal-weighted index by 17.8%. The raw return on the nontarget 
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stocks was 20.6%, and these underperformed the CRSP index by only 11.2%9. Turnover was 
lower in the target stocks, which is surprising to the extent that shareholders are more likely to 
vote with their feet against these firms. Finally, the descriptive statistics provide no evidence that 
the targets had higher institutional ownership, with the mean equity share of institutional 
investors at 62.8% and 63.9%, respectively. Furthermore, the data show that pressure-insensitive 
investors were underrepresented, while pressure-sensitiv  investors were overrepresented in the 
targets, despite the latter being less likely to support shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. 
Panel B of Table 6 compares the governance structures of the target and nontarget firms in 
terms of their use of antitakeover devices, board effectiveness, and CEO pay and ownership. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) Governance Index, which tracks 24 antitakeover 
provisions, confirms that the targets were better shielded from takeover threat than the nontargets, 
with an average 9.9 and 9.4 provisions in place, respectively. The statistics show no discernible 
difference based on Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) alternative Entrenchment Index. The 
targets and nontargets both employed an average 2.3 of what the authors regard as the six most 
important antitakeover devices: classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limits to bylaw 
and charter amendments, and supermajority provisions f r mergers10. 
We measure board effectiveness by (i) size, (ii) the proportion of executive directors, (iii) the 
average age of nonexecutive directors, and (iv) the ind pendence of the board chairman. The data 
show mixed evidence on how the targets and nontargets compared in terms of board quality. The 
targets had 11.3 directors on average, considerably more than the 9.6 directors nontargets had and 
the optimal board size of six to eight directors (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Furthermore, only 
12% of the targets separated the posts of CEO and board chairman, compared with 21% of the 
nontargets. However, the target boards were more ind pendent, with executives constituting 
16.3% of the board in the targets and 20.4% in the nontargets. The nonexecutive directors of the 
targets were also older thus more experienced, with a mean age of 59.9 years versus 59.1 years. 
Panel B of Table 6 finally considers two aspects of CEO wealth and compensation: (i) the 
CEO’s equity ownership and pay-performance sensitivity, which are viewed as a remedy for 
                                                  
9 While the literature customarily uses the CRSP equal-weighted index to price stock returns, this is a highly 
diversified index which encompasses even the smallest NYSE-, AMEX- and NASDAQ-traded stocks. This size 
effect explains why the large firms tracked by the various databases consistently underperform the index. 
10 The authors find that these six provisions are by far the most correlated with firm value and stock retu ns. 
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agency concerns (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), and (ii) the actual level of compensation, which 
may reflect agency problems of managerial rent-seeking (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The 
descriptives show that the CEOs had lower equity stakes in the targets than in the nontargets, at 
1.2% versus 2.5%. However, CEO pay was more high-powered in the targets, with options and 
restricted shares comprising an average 45% and 42% of total pay, respectively. As the targets 
were large, prominent firms, it is unsurprising that they granted more cash compensation at an 
$8.7 million versus $4.1 million. However, they underpaid their CEOs relative to their size and 
industry peers, as indicated by Cremer and Romano’s (2007) measure of abnormal compensation. 
The dollar sensitivity of the target CEOs’ total opti n holdings was also lower, with the value of 
the options increasing by $6.56 versus $10.73 for eve y $1,000 increase in firm value. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
We perform the multivariate analysis of target selection and proposal success using Heckman’s 
(1979) sample selection model, often referred to as a type-2 tobit model. Previous studies 
perform separate regressions to determine why firms get targeted with proxy proposals, and what 
drives proposal success in terms of the voting results and stock price effects. However, it is clear 
that the two are likely to be endogenous. On one hand, n activist is likely to consider the 
potential outcome before deciding whether or not to submit a proposal, given the nontrivial costs 
involved. On the other, the market and the voting shareholders may respond to the act of the 
submission beyond the objective of the proposal itse f, to the extent that this reveals a negative 
signal of exacerbated governance concerns, or in fact a positive signal of close monitoring by the 
activist. 
The sample selection model is specified as follows: 





















































where { }1 2,it itε ε are drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0, variances 21σ and 22σ , and 
correlation 12ρ (Amemiya, 1984). The variable*1ity  is a dummy variable showing whether firm i  is 
targeted in year t , while the variable*2ity is the outcome of interest i.e. (i) the voting outcme 
observed at the proposal level, or (ii) the CAR observed at the firm level around the proxy 
mailing date. It is assumed that only the sign of *1ity is observed, and that 
*
2ity is observed only 
when *1 0ity > . TheX variables correspond to the explanatory variables. 1itX  and 2itX  are not 
disjoint but do differ. 1itX is observed for all i , and includes firm-level variables as well as year 
and industry dummies. 2itX additionally includes proposal-related variables not observed when 
no proposal is submitted i.e.*1 0ity ≤ . 1β and 2β are vectors of the model coefficients. 
In a standard setting, the error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings. We relax this 
assumption across t  as well as allow the clustering of observations corresponding to a given firm 
i, i.e. we assume the error terms to be i.i.d. across firms but not necessarily for different 
observations within the same firm. This procedure enhances the robustness of our findings and 
allows us to take the panel data structure of our sample explicitly into account. 
Throughout the paper we call Equation (1) the selection equation and Equation (2) the 
outcome equation. As has been discussed, estimating the outcome equation independently would 
not be a valid alternative, because the OLS estimator of 2β is biased when the selection of the 
outcome sample is endogenous i.e. 12 0ρ ≠ . The sample selection model addresses the 
endogeneity of selection, and thus renders reliable parameter estimates for the outcome equation. 
 
4.3 Target selection 
The sample selection models analyzing the voting outcomes and the stock price effects are 
depicted in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. The selection equations, shown in Panel A, are 
configured identically in the two tables. However, the voting outcomes are observed at the 
proposal rather than the firm level, thus the selection equations of Table 7 overweight the targets 
with multiple proposals in a given year11. As the CARs are observed at the firm level, the 
                                                  
11 Firm-level specifications would yield unbiased results for the selection equations but lead to considerable loss of 
information on the individual proposals. For robustness, we performed the analysis at the firm level by excluding 
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corresponding selection equations are unbiased. Therefor , the remainder of this section discusses 
the selection equations shown in Panel A of Table 8. 
(Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here) 
The selection equations incorporate the firm characte istics discussed in Section 4.1 and 
described in Appendix A. Fama and French’s (2001) agency argument dictates that the 
probability of a proposal submission is related positively to firm size, and negatively to the debt-
to-equity and market-to-book ratios. However, market-to-book also serves as a proxy for 
informational asymmetries, thus the sign on this variable may be positive to the extent that 
activists use proxy proposals as a signaling device. Proposal probability should be related 
negatively to prior stock performance and positively to prior stock turnover. We control for 
ownership by both pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional investors, but 
conjecture that proposal probability only increases in the latter. 
We use Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) Entrenchment Index to account for the use of 
antitakeover devices, and expect the sign on the ind x to be positive in the regressions. Board 
quality is proxied by (i) size, (ii) the square of size, (iii) the proportion of executive directors, (iv) 
the age of nonexecutive directors, and (v) a dummy equal to one if the chairman is independent 
and zero otherwise. We expect the sign on size to be negative and on squared size to be positive, 
to the extent that boards should be neither too small nor too large. The sign should be positive on 
the proportion of executive directors, and negative on director age and chairman independence. 
The variables pertaining to CEO wealth and compensation re (i) ownership, (ii) stock-based to 
total pay; (iii) abnormal cash compensation relative o size and industry peers, and (iv) the dollar 
sensitivity of the CEO’s total option holdings to firm value. The signs should be negative on 
variables (i) and (ii) due to the incentive effects of wealth-performance sensitivity, and positive 
on (iii) and (iv) to the extent that high CEO pay reflects managerial rent-seeking. 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that the selection equations described above are very effective in 
explaining why firms get targeted with proxy proposals. We find that targets tend to be large, 
poorly performing firms with low leverage. Activists also observe the voting shareholders before 
deciding whether or not to sponsor proposals. In Model 5, proposal probability (i) increases by 
                                                                                                                                                      
firms targeted by multiple proposals in a given year, as well as by using the average voting outcomes. The results of 
the outcome equations were similar to those presentd i  Section 4.3, but the information loss was significant. 
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1% for every 1% stock held by pressure-insensitive institutions, but (ii) decreases by 1.8% for 
every 1% stock held by pressure-sensitive institutions. This latter result shows that activists 
perceive conflicted voting by pressure-sensitive investors to be a considerable threat. 
The main contribution of the analysis is that regardless of their objective, proposals are more 
likely to be submitted against firms that (i) use antit keover provisions to entrench management, 
(ii) have ineffective boards, and (iii) have ill-incentivized CEOs. The Entrenchment Index is 
significant at the 1% level, with proposal probability increasing by 24.8% in Model 5 for every 
antitakeover device the firm has in place. This result is fully robust to Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick’s (2003) broader Governance Index. In terms of board quality, we find the expected 
nonlinear relation between target selection and board size, and that firms with older thus more 
experienced nonexecutive directors are less likely to be targeted. Finally, we confirm the 
relevance of CEO wealth and compensation. Consistent with their incentive effects, proposal 
probability decreases in both CEO ownership and the proportion of stock-based to total pay. We 
find no statistical evidence that proposal probability ncreases in the level of abnormal cash 
compensation. However, it increases in the dollar sensitivity of the CEO’s total option holdings, 
which implies that activists associate excessive option grants with managerial rentseeking. 
 
4.4 Voting outcomes 
The outcome equations analyzing voting success are depicted in Panel B of Table 7 and 
summarized in Appendix B. The models incorporate th firm-level variables included in the 
selection equations. We expect that these variables aff ct proposal probability and voting success 
in a similar way, with the exception of firm size. While proposals tend to be directed at large 
firms, the dispersed ownership structures of very large targets should make voting coalitions 
difficult to build. Thus, we expect that voting success and the log of assets are negatively related. 
In addition to the firm-level variables, the outcome equations include 14 variables capturing 
the proposal characteristics. Times submitted is the number of times a proposal has been 
submitted in consecutive years. Gillan and Starks (2000) find, and our univariate results confirm, 
that resubmissions of unimplemented proposals tend to improve the voting outcomes12. Number 
                                                  
12 In our sample, first-time submissions received 30.4% of the votes on average, while fifth-time submissions 
received 48.6%. Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that some of this improvement is likely to be due to selection bias. 
On one hand, activists may only resubmit the proposals they expect to achieve better outcomes. On the ot r, the 
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of proposals in proxy indicates the number of proposals announced in the same proxy statement. 
While it is not immediate how this should affect voting success, we conjecture that the more 
proposals submitted, the greater the support from the voting shareholders due to the stronger 
signal conveyed over governance concerns. Finally, we use twelve dummy variables to control 
for the proposal objective and the sponsoring sharehold r. All proposals are uniquely allocated to 
an issue and a sponsor type, such that the intercept represents proposals addressing miscellaneous 
issues and sponsored by individual investors. We expect that proposals that are takeover-related 
or sponsored by institutional investors attract the most voting support. 
The model statistics in Table 7 confirm that target s lection and voting success are 
endogenous, with ρ  sensitive to the model specification but significant in all but one case. 
Results not reported here also show that independent analysis of the voting outcomes produces 
somewhat different parameter estimates and has lower explanatory power overall. This shows 
that sample selection models are the appropriate tool for the analysis of the voting results. 
The outcome equations in Panel B of Table 7 confirm that the voting success of proxy 
proposals is largely driven by the proposal characteristics. In Model 5, the intercept shows that 
miscellaneous proposals sponsored by individuals receiv  28.4% of the votes cast. In comparison, 
proposals directed at antitakeover devices win 39.0% more voting support, while those targeting 
voting issues achieve 20.0%, and board, compensatio nd audit-related proposals receive 8.0%, 
6.6% and 4.6% more votes, respectively. Of the institutional proposal sponsors, investment funds 
and public pension funds collect 10.2% and 6.3% more v tes than do individual activists, while 
union pension funds achieve 2.6% additional support. We find that each resubmission of the 
same proposal improves the voting outcome by 0.9%, and that each additional proposal included 
in the proxy statement contributes 0.4% more votes. 
Despite the careful target selection process we documented earlier, the firm-level variables 
add significant explanatory power to the outcome equations as well. As predicted, voting success 
is related negatively to firm size. Interestingly, while target selection is largely driven by market 
                                                                                                                                                      
SEC states that if a proposal has received less than a specified percentage of the votes, the target firm can refuse to 
take proposals of the same subject matter for three years. To avoid exclusion, a proposal must have rec iv d at least 
3% of the votes on its first submission, 6% on the second, and 10% on the third. In 1997, the SEC proposed to 
increase these hurdles to 6%, 15%, and 30%, respectively, amid claims that firms were becoming inundated with 
shareholder proposals. However, these changes have yet to be implemented. 
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performance, the subsequent voting results are related to the prior stock turnover. The models 
show that voting success also depends on the identity of the voting shareholders. In Model 5, a 
1% ownership by pressure-insensitive investors improves the voting outcome by 0.1%. The 
impact of ownership by pressure-sensitive investors is insignificantly negative. 
Finally, the results confirm that the voting shareholders also observe the target firm’s 
governance quality. Irrespective of the objective of the proposal, voting success increases in the 
Entrenchment Index by 0.9% for each antitakeover provision the target has in place. As before, 
this result is fully robust to the broader Governance Index. The voting outcomes also show the 
expected nonlinear relation with board size. 
 
4.5 Stock price effects 
The outcome equations investigating the stock price effects are shown in Panel B of Table 8 and 
summarized in Appendix B. As before, we control for the firm characteristics included in the 
selection equations, and conjecture that these variables affect target selection and the CARs in the 
same way. The proposal characteristics are again proxied by a set of 14 variables. The dummies 
pertaining to the proposal objectives and the sponsori g shareholders are now equal to one if the 
proxy statement includes a corresponding proposal and zero otherwise. We expect that proposals 
that are takeover-related or sponsored by institutional investors generate stronger stock price 
effects. The CARs should be related positively to the Number of proposals in proxy variable, to 
the extent that multiple submissions exert greater discipline as well as achieve better voting 
results. The proposal-level Times submitted variable is replaced by the firm-level Targeted in 
previous year dummy. We conjecture that this variable is related n gatively to the CARs, because 
while consecutive submissions draw more voting support, their marginal information content is 
lower, and they may be viewed as a follow-up attempt at disciplinary action that is likely to fail. 
The Table 8 statistics show that the models have strong explanatory power, even though we 
can only measure the market response to the proxy statements rather than the individual 
proposals. The results show limited evidence that te s ock price effects are endogenous to target 
selection, with ρ  significant in just two of the five models. Nonethless, independent regressions 
of the CARs are again less powerful and produce slightly different parameter estimates. 
Remarkably, the outcome equations in Panel B show tat the CARs are better explained by 
the firm characteristics than the features of the proposals announced. Nonetheless, we confirm the 
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univariate findings of Table 4 that the most positive stock price effects are induced by proposals 
that are takeover-related or sponsored by public pension funds. In Model 5, the CARs generated 
by takeover-related proposals are 0.57% higher than t ose pertaining to the miscellaneous 
proposals represented by the intercept. At the same ti e, the CARs are higher by as much as 
1.09% if the proposal sponsor is a public pension fund rather than an individual. The regressions 
show only marginal evidence that the CARs are lower if the firm has previously been targeted. 
However, the CARs are related negatively rather than positively to the number of proposals 
included in the proxy. This may be because multiple submissions achieve only marginally better 
voting results, and may convey a particularly strong negative signal of governance concerns. 
Of the firm characteristics, the size of the target shows a strong positive relation with the 
stock price effects, which confirms that the perceived control benefits of proxy proposals are 
greatest in large, prominent firms. The results also confirm that the CARs decrease in the market 
performance of the target’s stock and increase in its turnover. In the sample selection framework 
there is no evidence that the market observes the voting shareholders, despite the findings to the 
contrary of Gillan and Starks (2000) and Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Parrino (2006).  
The model statistics reveal that the stock price eff cts are most fundamentally driven by the 
target’s governance quality, even as the proposal sponsors tend to target firms with generally 
poor governance structures. The CARs are most sensitive to the target’s use of antitakeover 
devices. The Entrenchment Index is significant at the 1% level across all specifications, with 
Model 5 showing that irrespective of the proposal objective, the CARs increase by 0.24% for 
every antitakeover provision the target has in place. There is also evidence that the CARs 
decrease in the proportion of stock-based pay in CEO compensation, in line with the perceived 
incentive implications of pay-performance sensitivity. 
Overall, these results confirm that shareholder-initiated proxy proposals have a more 
meaningful role in corporate governance than has been previously assumed in the literature. On 
one hand, there is evidence that the sponsoring shareholders are valuable monitoring agents, to 
the extent that they target underperforming firms with poor governance. On the other, proposal 
submissions are clearly attributed nontrivial contrl benefits by both the market and the voting 






This paper has contributed to the academic debate on whether shareholder-initiated proxy 
proposals are a useful and relevant agency control device. Previous research has shown that 
proposals winning a majority vote are likely to be implemented, because the target firm and its 
board of directors risk suffering reputational penalties otherwise. However, it has been heavily 
debated whether activists use proxy proposals to discipl ne firms or to simply advance their self-
serving agendas, and whether proposal submissions are effective at all in addressing corporate 
governance concerns. 
Using the largest sample yet examined as well as extensive controls for governance quality, 
we have made important contributions to the literature. We have shown that claims of agenda-
seeking by the proposal sponsors are likely to be exaggerated, because they tend to target firms 
that underperform, are underlevered, and have generally poor governance structures. Moreover, 
proposal announcements in the proxy statements have positive stock price effects, and both the 
market and the voting shareholders respond as much to the target firm’s governance quality as to 
the proposal’s objective and sponsoring shareholder. Finally, we have addressed the endogeneity 
of target selection and proposal success for the first time, using Heckman (1979) sample selection 
models. 
Overall, we conclude that shareholder proposals should be regarded as a useful governance 
mechanism and the proposal sponsors as valuable monitoring agents, especially when the market 
for corporate control can no longer exert discipline. Our empirical results complement Harris and 
Raviv’s (2008) recent theoretical finding that in frms where agency concerns are exacerbated, it 
is optimal that shareholders exercise control over corporate decisions. At the same time, they lend 
support to Bebchuk’s (2005) advocacy of shareholder participation, against the argument of 
Bainbridge (2006) and other legal scholars that shareholder proposals disrupt the decision-
making authority of the board of directors and should be restricted by the SEC. Whether and how 
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Table 1: Shareholder proposals by sponsor type and year of submission 
Year N 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Union pension funds 926 49 36 44 55 42 60 81 215 178 166 
UBCJA 159 8 2 3 - 1 2 13 36 44 50 
Teamsters 120 12 12 9 7 6 27 14 18 6 9 
Longview 91 7 5 5 6 11 10 11 16 10 10 
Sheet Metal Workers 74 - - - - 1 - 2 23 21 27 
Plumbers and Pipefitters 70 - - - 6 - 1 7 25 24 7 
AFL-CIO 67 - - 1 4 3 3 3 18 15 20 
IBEW 67 1 3 3 7 4 6 8 20 8 7 
Laborers 65 4 - 2 4 - 3 10 20 14 8 
AFSCME 51 - - - - 5 5 5 13 13 10 
Public pension funds 136 13 8 18 15 12 10 21 12 11 16 
New York City 84 10 6 10 8 7 7 11 7 7 11 
CalPERS 19 - 1 4 2 3 2 2 - 2 3 
TIAA-CREF 16 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 2 1 - 
Connecticut 10 - - - - - - 4 3 1 2 
Investment funds 62 2 5 3 7 16 6 4 5 7 7 
GAMCO Investors 17 - - 1 - 2 2 3 4 3 2 
Jewelcor Management 9 - - - 2 5 2 - - - - 
Greenway Partners 6 1 3 1 - - 1 - - - - 
Coordinated investors 197 48 35 24 16 16 18 7 2 9 22 
IRAA 174 47 34 22 14 14 14 2 - 7 20 
BellTel Retirees 20 - - 2 2 2 4 5 2 2 1 
Socially responsible/religious investors 121 5 11 8 16 15 7 7 17 10 25 
ICCR 61 5 11 7 8 8 2 1 3 6 10 
Catholic Funds 13 - - - - - - - 2 - 11 
UFE/Responsible Wealth 13 - - - 8 - 1 2 2 - - 
Individuals 1350 88 130 121 132 116 124 140 194 177 128 
Evelyn Y. Davis 301 21 35 38 32 29 33 29 32 28 24 
Chevedden family 150 2 4 7 11 13 16 17 30 27 23 
Rossi family 134 3 3 3 4 4 6 27 44 28 12 
Gilbert family 96 22 23 24 11 6 5 5 - - - 
Gerald R. Armstrong 44 1 4 5 5 4 4 3 7 5 6 
Morse family 34 6 3 - 5 4 1 3 - 12 - 
Prominent individuals 20 - - - - 1 3 2 8 2 4 
Total proposals 2792 205 225 218 241 217 225 260 445 392 364 
Abbreviations: UBCJA – United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; AFL-CIO – American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; IBEW – International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers; AFSCME – American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; CalPERS – California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System; TIAA-CREF – Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College 
Retirement Equities Fund; IRAA – Investor Rights Association of America; ICCR – Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility; UFE – United for a Fair Economy. 
 
Table 2: Shareholder proposals by issue addressed and year of submission 
Year N 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Antitakeover issues 981 83 59 66 96 89 91 119 159 120 99 
Repeal classified board 440 55 35 44 57 48 43 40 46 34 38 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 312 13 18 12 24 25 20 48 82 49 21 
Remove golden parachutes 129 11 4 4 9 6 12 18 17 26 22 
Eliminate/reduce supermajority provision 66 1 - 2 3 7 12 10 9 7 15 
Restore right to special meeting/written consent 9 - - 3 1 1 1 - 2 - 1 
Reincorporate in a different state 10 1 1 - 1 - - 2 2 3 - 
Remove all antitakeover provisions 6 - - - 1 2 3 - - - - 
Prohibit targeted share placement 4 1 1 1 - - - - - - 1 
Opt out of state takeover statute 3 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - 
Adopt antigreenmail provision 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 
Repeal fair price provision 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Board issues 495 56 58 43 43 38 44 47 62 59 45 
Independent board chairman 102 1 3 6 3 2 4 2 27 31 23 
Increase board independence 73 4 9 7 11 8 5 11 6 9 3 
Increase key committee independence 52 5 5 7 4 4 6 13 3 2 3 
Independent lead director 6 - 1 1 2 1 - - - 1 - 
Director tenure/retirement age 47 3 7 5 4 3 5 5 6 6 3 
Limit number of directorships 8 2 - - 1 2 - - - 1 2 
Director liability 5 2 1 - - - - - - - 2 
Double board nominees 46 - - - 2 5 16 8 10 4 1 
Equal access to the proxy 7 - 1 1 - 1 1 - - 1 2 
Eliminate advance notice requirement 2 - - - - - - 1 1 - - 
Create key committee 11 2 1 4 2 - - 1 - 1 - 
Board inclusiveness 44 4 5 4 6 5 5 4 6 2 3 
Board size 2 - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 
Board attendance 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - 
Union/employee representation 8 1 2 1 3 - - 1 - - - 
Director ownership 10 2 4 - 1 3 - - - - - 
Pay directors in stock 31 11 11 3 - 2 1 1 - - 2 
Restrict director compensation 11 2 2 1 2 - - - 2 1 1 
Restrict director pensions 28 16 5 3 2 2 - - - - - 
Voting issues 354 31 38 46 36 27 25 25 17 32 77 
Adopt cumulative voting 221 21 31 37 26 20 17 17 17 19 16 
Adopt majority vote to elect directors 69 - 1 - - - - - - 11 57 
Adopt confidential voting 45 8 3 6 5 5 7 5 - 1 3 
Allow vote against directors 5 - - 1 1 - - 3 - - - 
No discretionary voting 9 2 3 - 4 - - - - - - 
Counting shareholder votes 7 - - 2 - 2 1 - - 1 1 
Executive compensation issues 608 22 33 26 39 22 29 26 170 137 104 
Implement compensation plan 27 - - - - - - - - 25 2 
Approval of deferred compensation plan 15 - - - - - - - 5 7 3 
Approve compensation 7 1 1 1 - - - 1 2 - 1 
Restrict compensation 78 4 6 7 13 4 1 2 7 6 28 
Abolish/suspend stock options/stock grants 64 6 4 - 7 5 3 4 10 18 7 
Performance-based stock options/stock grants 96 1 - - 4 1 8 4 56 3 19 
Performance/time-based restricted shares 44 - - - - - - - - 25 19 
Link pay to performance 29 3 4 4 2 1 6 1 2 4 2 
Link pay to dividends 11 2 5 2 2 - - - - - - 
Link pay to social criteria 17 - 1 - 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 
Disclose compensation 45 5 8 9 6 4 2 2 3 3 3 
Review/report on executive compensation 24 - 4 1 1 2 2 - 10 1 3 
Expense stock options 115 - - - - - - 2 68 34 11 
Require option shares to be held 16 - - - - 1 - - 2 9 4 
No repricing of underwater stock options 7 - - 2 2 1 1 1 - - - 
Pension fund surplus 13 - - - - - 2 5 4 1 1 
Study sale of company 116 5 17 19 17 26 18 1 2 5 6 
Audit issues 70 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 16 16 7 
Routine issues 35 2 6 10 3  6 3 2 2 - 
Other 139 8 13 8 6 13 11 15 17 22 26 
Total proposals 2792 205 225 218 241 217 225 260 445 392 364 
 











Study sale   
of company 





 Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) 
Total 53.4 (969) 19.3 (484) 32.3 (341) 21.5 (591) 14.2 (112) 21.7 (69) 5.4 (32) 13.2 (128) 32.9 (2726)
Panel A: Issue addressed and year of submission 
1996 42.4 (81) 20.2 (53) 24.8 (29) 12.0 (20) 14.2 (5) 10.8 (1) 5.2 (2) 14.2 (5) 28.7 (196) 
1997 45.5 (59) 13.6 (57) 25.9 (35) 10.8 (33) 19.2 (17) 3.8 (1) 6.0 (5) 8.4 (13) 23.6 (220) 
1998 47.2 (66) 19.1 (42) 28.9 (43) 9.1 (23) 10.3 (19) 18.6 (1) 5.2 (10) 8.8 (7) 27.0 (211) 
1999 48.0 (93) 20.2 (42) 27.9 (34) 10.8 (37) 12.5 (17) 23.3 (1) 3.8 (3) 5.9 (6) 29.8 (233) 
2000 51.2 (88) 20.9 (37) 31.7 (26) 10.6 (21) 18.6 (24) 20.9 (1) 4.2 (1) 9.7 (12) 32.9 (210) 
2001 50.6 (91) 13.8 (44) 34.8 (24) 15.3 (29) 11.8 (17) 29.5 (1) 4.9 (5) 18.4 (11) 31.3 (222) 
2002 54.9 (118) 18.6 (47) 35.5 (24) 18.4 (25) 13.8 (1) 25.4 (24) 4.8 (3) 11.4 (14) 36.9 (256) 
2003 59.8 (155) 21.2 (58) 33.1 (17) 28.7 (162) 3.2 (2) 14.4 (16) 3.8 (1) 18.3 (17) 38.0 (428) 
2004 60.0 (120) 23.1 (59) 26.3 (32) 23.8 (137) 20.4 (5) 24.2 (16) 11.4 (2) 14.1 (21) 34.4 (392) 
2005 61.2 (98) 22.6 (45) 42.7 (77) 29.9 (104) 2.5 (5) 23.1 (7)   14.7 (22) 37.1 (358) 
Panel B: Issue addressed and sponsor type 
Union pension funds 51.6 (286) 21.7 (141) 38.0 (93) 28.7 (309) 12.3 (1) 22.6 (57)   12.3 (27) 34.8 (914) 
Public pension funds 57.6 (63) 31.1 (38) 33.1 (10) 32.6 (12)       19.7 (10) 43.0 (133) 
Investment funds 54.7 (26) 24.9 (5) 25.3 (1) 5.5 (2) 29.1 (18)     46.8 (4) 41.0 (56) 
Coordinated investors 48.5 (79) 20.8 (39)   12.6 (20) 11.7 (56)       28.6 (194) 
Socially responsible/religious investors72.0 (5) 25.7 (10) 43.5 (2) 9.0 (16)       8.9 (2) 23.7 (35) 
Individuals 54.3 (505) 14.6 (208) 30.0 (235) 13.9 (200) 10.7 (37) 19.1 (10) 5.4 (32) 11.5 (81) 32.1 (1308)
 
Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns around proxy mailing dates 
Event 
window 
N Mean Median 
Positive: 
negative 
Z test Sign test 
[-1,+1] 1739 0.25 0.02 877:862 2.59***  1.65* 
[-1,0] 1739 0.16 0.00 868:871 1.66*  1.20 
[0,+1] 1739 0.16 0.06 883:856 2.47**  1.92* 
[-2,+2] 1739 0.37 0.01 871:868 2.39**  1.34 
[-1,+5] 1739 0.39 0.07 880:859 1.71*  1.77* 
[-1,+7] 1739 0.48 0.07 880:859 1.92*  1.77* 
This table shows percent cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the date that the proxy statements are mailed. 
Market model parameters are estimated over the 200-day period ending 20 days before the proxy mailing date, using 
the CRSP equal-weighted index. The significance of the means and medians is tested using Boehmer, Musumeci, 
and Poulsen’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional Z-test and Cowan’s (1992) generalized sign test, respectively. *, 
** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 




Board    
issues 












 Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) 
Total 0.44***  (805) 0.30 (414) -0.03 (322) 0.02 (493) 0.59 (115) -0.06 (68) 0.16 (35) -0.35 (51) 0.25***  (1739) 
Panel A: Issue addressed and year of submission 
1996 0.12 (69) -0.19 (48) 0.23 (29) -0.33 (19) 3.54 (5) -2.04 (1) 0.25 (2) -0.19 (5) -0.28 (130) 
1997 0.12 (50) -0.06 (48) -0.91**  (37) 0.06 (30) -0.52 (17) -2.34 (1) 0.30 (6) -0.20 (13) 0.08 (142) 
1998 0.44 (60) -0.11 (36) -0.54 (44) -0.38 (21) -0.32 (18) 1.12 (1) -0.19 (10) 1.55 (7) 0.13 (150) 
1999 0.76 (82) 0.23 (39) 0.28 (31) 1.18 (37) 2.10 (17) -1.55 (1) -0.52 (3) -0.74 (6) 0.45 (162) 
2000 1.69***  (76) 3.28***  (31) 0.78 (22) 1.38 (20) 0.92 (26) 1.60 (1) 0.50 (1) 2.40 (13) 2.00***  (150) 
2001 0.64 (69) -0.68 (38) -0.19 (20) -0.09 (26) -0.28 (18) -0.14 (1) 0.28 (6) -1.48 (9) 0.07 (151) 
2002 0.07 (91) 0.94 (36) -1.16 (24) -0.87 (25) -1.53 (1) 0.62 (24) 1.31 (3) -0.17 (13) 0.05 (163) 
2003 -0.02 (132) -0.10 (53) -0.31 (16) -0.89**  (126) -0.34 (2) -0.64 (15) 2.67 (2) -0.80 (14) -0.40* (246) 
2004 0.24 (95) 0.68 (47) -0.05 (29) 0.55**  (112) 1.25 (5) -0.34 (16) -2.31 (2) 0.43 (19) 0.40 (237) 
2005 0.67***  (81) -0.14 (38) 0.77***  (70) 0.33 (77) 0.97 (6) -0.05 (7)   -1.00 (23) 0.16*  (197) 
Panel B: Issue addressed and sponsor type 
Union pension funds 0.35 (267) 0.04 (135) 0.84***  (92) -0.09 (266) 9.57 (1) 0.04 (55)   0.19 (28) 0.16*  (703) 
Public pension funds 1.35**  (62) 2.37* (37) -0.33 (10) -2.72 (12)       0.65 (11) 1.08**  (131) 
Investment funds 0.00 (26) 0.12 (6) -6.51 (1) -0.79 (2) 1.66 (19)     0.17 (4) 0.53 (54) 
Coordinated investors 0.20 (72) 0.06 (38)   0.57 (19) 0.14 (59)       0.34 (141) 
Socially responsible/religious investors2.98 (10) -0.22 (49) 0.99 (2) -0.34 (47)   0.70 (2)   -0.75 (6) 0.14 (113) 
Individuals 0.29 (427) 0.13 (187) -0.31 (225) 0.33 (191) 0.46 (37) -0.68 (11) 0.16 (35) -0.31 (76) 0.06 (945) 
This table shows percent cumulative abnormal returns in the days [-1,+1] surrounding the date that the proxy statements are mailed. Market model parameters ar  
estimated over the 200-day period ending 20 days before the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equal-weighted index. The significance of the means is tested 
using Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional Z-test. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectivly. 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of target and nontarget firms 
  Targets   Nontargets  





Panel A: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Assets ($ millions) 1494 46,549 10,538 129,968 9096 7,252 1,459 28,421 39,298*** 9,079*** 
Sales ($ millions) 1494 15,773 7,139 14,456 9096 3,291 1,208 7,459 12,482*** 5,931*** 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1494 1.45 0.91 11.20 9096 1.35 0.55 34.82 0.11 0.37*** 
Market-to-book ratio 1494 3.02 2.29 12.17 9096 4.32 2.30 79.35 -1.29 -0.01 
Prior one-year raw stock return (%) 1494 14.48 11.57 46.17 9096 20.56 13.61 72.32 -6.08*** -2.04*** 
Prior one-year abnormal stock return (%) 1494 -17.75 -18.80 46.24 9096 -11.22 -16.51 71.59 -6.54*** -2.29*** 
Prior one-year stock turnover 1494 1.37 1.04 1.13 9096 1.73 1.17 1.77 -0.37*** -0.13*** 
Institutional ownership (%) 1494 62.72 63.23 16.54 9096 63.88 65.01 20.90 -1.16** -1.78*** 
Institutional ownership - pressure sensitive (%) 1494 13.56 12.95 5.93 9096 11.48 10.39 6.48 2.08*** 2.56*** 
Institutional ownership - pressure insensitive (%)1494 49.16 48.86 15.98 9096 52.40 52.61 20.08 -3.24*** -3.75*** 
Panel B: Governance characteristics 
Governance Index (max=24) 1494 9.91 10 2.48 9096 9.40 9 2.67 0.51*** 1*** 
Entrenchment Index (max=6) 1494 2.34 2 1.31 9096 2.30 2 1.27 0.04 0 
Board size 1494 11.31 11 3.01 9096 9.55 9 2.90 1.76*** 2*** 
Executive directors (%) 1494 16.28 13.33 9.10 9096 20.44 16.67 11.15 -4.16*** -3.33*** 
Average age of nonexecutive directors 1494 59.93 60 2.99 9096 59.09 59.33 3.81 0.83*** 0.67*** 
Separate chair and CEO (binary) 1494 0.12 0 0.32 9096 0.21 0 0.41 -0.10*** 0*** 
CEO ownership (%) 1494 1.19 0.12 4.36 9096 2.45 3.58 5.96 -1.27*** -3.46*** 
Stock-based to total CEO compensation (%) 1494 45.03 48.02 28.26 9096 42.18 43.45 28.67 2.85*** 4.57*** 
CEO compensation excluding option grants 1494 8,658 3,302 26,670 9096 4,117 1,620 10,307 4,541*** 1,682*** 
Abnormal CEO compensation 1494 -0.09 -0.20 0.94 9096 0.01 -0.11 1.04 -0.10*** -0.09*** 
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings 1494 6.56 3.19 10.66 9096 10.73 7.05 12.38 -4.17*** -3.86*** 
This table compares the characteristics of firms that are targeted and firms that are not targeted by shareholder proposals in a given year. The variables ar  
described in Appendix A. The difference in means t-tes  assumes unequal variances when the test of equal variances is rejected at the 10% level. The significa ce 
of the difference in medians is based on Wilcoxon ranksum tests. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and voting results 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat 
Panel A:  Selection equations 
Intercept -7.053*** -15.04 -6.574***  -4.66 -6.607***  -4.69 -5.372***  -3.32 -6.765***  -4.78
Log of assets 0.380*** 20.13 0.402***  23.62 0.401***  23.61 0.394***  22.42 0.400***  23.80
Debt-to-equity -0.006*** -2.69 -0.031***  -2.94 -0.032***  -3.12 -0.034***  -3.16 -0.031***  -3.06
Market-to-book 0.001 0.51 0.007***  2.63 0.007** 2.31 0.005 1.03 0.007** 2.33
Prior one-year abnormal stock return -0.123 -1.10 -0.242** -2.01 -0.261** -2.27 -0.256** -1.98 -0.249** -2.13
Prior one-year stock turnover 0.038 0.87 -0.007 -0.09 -0.025 -0.30 -0.026 -0.29 -0.022 -0.27
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive 0.396 0.46 1.336 1.39 1.543* 1.65 0.937 0.85 1.504 1.64
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive 0.493 0.90 0.558 0.72 0.427 0.57 1.004* 1.94 0.436 0.59
Entrenchment index     0.077 1.37 0.071 1.26 -0.020 -0.33 0.058 0.97
Board size     -0.155 -1.16 -0.154 -1.19 -0.093 -0.78 -0.134 -1.03
Board size squared     0.001 0.19 0.001 0.22 -0.001 -0.27 0.000 0.05
Executive directors     -0.087 -0.09 -0.117 -0.12 -0.828 -0.91 -0.111 -0.12
Average age of nonexecutive directors     0.006 0.34 0.006 0.36 -0.015 -0.70 0.008 0.45
Separate chair and CEO     0.228 1.06 0.211 1.00 0.184 0.86 0.229 1.08
CEO ownership     -2.900***  -2.94 -2.905***  -3.01 -3.003***  -3.02 -2.860***  -2.92
Stock-based to total CEO compensation     -0.107 -0.40 -0.080 -0.29 -0.160 -0.65 -0.127 -0.46
Abnormal CEO compensation     -0.012 -0.22 -0.010 -0.19 -0.004 -0.07 -0.017 -0.32
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings     0.022***  4.33 0.023***  4.28 0.022***  3.97 0.023***  4.23
 
 
Table 7: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and voting results (continued) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat
Panel B:  Outcome equations 
Intercept 3.739 **  1.90 5.149**  2.58 26.178 ***  3.41 67.765***  4.57 28.429**  2.57
Times submitted 0.663 **  2.56 0.581**  2.24 0.880***  3.38     0.860***  3.35
Number of proposals in proxy -0.003  -0.01 -0.132 -0.40 0.267 1.10     0.417*  1.66
Proposal - Antitakeover 39.826 ***  23.23 40.408***  23.67 39.501***  22.31     39.019***  21.69
Proposal - Board 7.294 ***  4.47 7.317***  4.41 8.040***  4.70     8.008***  4.61
Proposal - Voting 19.789 ***  10.90 20.112***  10.95 19.937***  10.88     19.957***  10.71
Proposal - Compensation 6.162 ***  3.69 6.216***  3.67 6.844***  3.89     6.616***  3.75
Proposal - Sale of company 3.303  1.59 3.964*  1.84 2.342 1.07     2.087 0.96
Proposal - Audit 4.828 **  2.00 4.729*  1.92 4.775*  1.92     4.569*  1.86
Proposal - Routine -2.376  -1.37 -2.382 -1.30 -1.424 -0.76     -1.577 -0.85
Sponsor - Union pension fund 3.888 ***  3.80 3.996***  3.92 2.931***  3.07     2.576***  2.68
Sponsor - Public pension fund 9.044 ***  4.67 9.601***  4.92 6.666***  3.58     6.336***  3.38
Sponsor - Investment fund 10.196 **  2.28 11.777***  2.69 10.411**  2.57     10.207**  2.58
Sponsor - Coordinated investors 0.352 0.26 1.260 0.94 -0.400 -0.31     -0.605 -0.47
Sponsor - Socially responsible/religious -0.986 -0.65 -0.836 -0.55 -1.027 -0.65     -1.209 -0.74
Log of assets         -1.095***  -3.58 -2.356***  -4.46 -0.758**  -2.09
Debt-to-equity         -0.023 -0.55 -0.066**  -2.32 -0.029 -0.70
Market-to-book         0.027 1.16 0.087*  1.90 0.029 1.26
Prior one-year abnormal stock return         -0.003 -0.00 -0.322 -0.27 -0.121 -0.14
Prior one-year stock turnover         1.298***  2.63 1.154*  1.70 1.130**  2.23
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive         -8.828 -1.04 25.177*  1.69 -6.254 -0.80
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive         12.564***  3.70 19.405***  3.82 11.102***  3.32
Entrenchment index             2.953***  5.73 0.908**  2.53
Board size             -0.014 -0.02 -1.108**  -2.17
Board size squared             0.002 0.09 0.037**  2.17
Executive directors             -1.234 -0.20 1.403 0.31
Average age of nonexecutive directors             -0.033 -0.16 -0.078 -0.50
Separate chair and CEO             -3.704**  -2.15 -0.572 -0.45
CEO ownership             -7.653 -0.61 -2.925 -0.27
Stock-based to total CEO compensation             1.776 0.95 1.805 1.28
Abnormal CEO compensation             -0.590 -1.08 0.281 0.71
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings             -0.082 -1.31 0.026 0.51
 
 
Table 7: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and voting results (continued) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Number of observations 11485  11485  11485  11485  11485 
Number of uncensored observations 2338  2338  2338  2338  2338 
Number of proposals 1960  1960  1960  1960  1960 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald χ2 2206.1***   2434.1***   2735.8***   362.3***   3007.5***  
Log-likelihood 918.8  953.1  1027.9  166.5  1039.4 
ρ 0.711***   -0.288  -0.380***   -0.859***   -0.332***  
In the selection equations of Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a shareholder proposal has been submitted and zero otherwise. In the 
outcome equations of Panel B, the dependent variable s the percentage of votes FOR shareholder proposals. The firm-level independent variables included in both 
Panels A and B are described in Appendix A. The proposal-level independent variables in Panel B are dummies equal to one if the variable description holds and 
zero otherwise. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Wald χ2 tests the joint significance of the outcome and selection equation pairs. ρ 
= 0 tests the independence of the outcome and selection equation pairs using a Wald χ2 test. T-statistics in parentheses use standard errors with White (1980) 
correction for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering of observations on each firm. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, r spectively. 
 
Table 8: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and cumulative abnormal returns 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat 
Panel A:  Selection equations 
Intercept -8.838***  -11.76 0.037 0.01 -0.002 0.00 -0.169 -0.07 -0.144 -0.06
Log of assets 0.548***  12.96 0.598***  16.38 0.595***  16.62 0.592***  16.45 0.592***  16.56
Debt-to-equity -0.004***  -3.81 -0.030***  -5.03 -0.030***  -5.18 -0.030***  -5.39 -0.030***  -5.33
Market-to-book 0.000 0.23 0.004* 1.82 0.003* 1.67 0.003 1.57 0.003 1.59
Prior one-year abnormal stock return -0.200**  -2.12 -0.274**  -2.13 -0.238* -1.88 -0.220* -1.73 -0.224* -1.77
Prior one-year stock turnover 0.095***  6.88 0.044 1.22 0.041 1.11 0.045 1.29 0.044 1.25
Institutional ownership - pressure sensitive -3.137***  -2.95 -1.895* -1.73 -1.904* -1.69 -1.784 -1.63 -1.815* -1.65
Institutional ownership - pressure insensitive 1.361***  4.07 1.035***  3.61 1.019***  3.67 0.994***  3.73 0.998***  3.71
Entrenchment index     0.264***  2.74 0.259***  2.71 0.247***  2.65 0.248***  2.65
Board size     -0.246***  -3.31 -0.244***  -3.34 -0.236***  -3.19 -0.237***  -3.21
Board size squared     0.007***  3.30 0.007***  3.29 0.007***  3.13 0.007***  3.15
Executive directors     -0.096 -0.10 -0.061 -0.06 0.007 0.01 0.010 0.01
Average age of nonexecutive directors     -0.139***  -3.29 -0.137***  -3.27 -0.134***  -3.23 -0.135***  -3.23
Separate chair and CEO     0.102 0.38 0.104 0.39 0.097 0.36 0.098 0.36
CEO ownership     -1.115* -1.78 -1.061* -1.81 -0.971* -1.84 -0.979* -1.84
Stock-based to total CEO compensation     -1.111***  -3.38 -1.090***  -3.39 -1.038***  -3.40 -1.041***  -3.39
Abnormal CEO compensation     0.107* 1.64 0.103 1.56 0.095 1.38 0.096 1.41
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings     0.022***  5.78 0.022***  5.83 0.022***  5.88 0.022***  5.87
 
 
Table 8: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and cumulative abnormal returns (continued) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat  CoefficientT-stat 
Panel B:  Outcome equations 
Intercept -0.586 -1.53 -0.588 -1.53 -5.137***  -2.92 -0.023 -0.75 -3.481 -1.16
Targeted in previous year -0.347 -1.43 -0.351 -1.45 -0.397 -1.62     -0.382 -1.57
Number of proposals in proxy -0.236 -1.37 -0.236 -1.37 -0.310* -1.83     -0.299 * -1.78
Proposal - Antitakeover 0.614**  2.06 0.615**  2.06 0.675**  2.27     0.565 * 1.89
Proposal - Board 0.500 1.46 0.500 1.47 0.465 1.37     0.509 1.48
Proposal - Voting 0.082 0.26 0.085 0.27 0.081 0.26     0.161 0.53
Proposal - Compensation 0.147 0.48 0.149 0.49 0.104 0.34     0.088 0.29
Proposal - Sale of company 0.407 0.66 0.406 0.66 0.580 0.93     0.531 0.84
Proposal - Audit -0.019 -0.04 -0.016 -0.03 0.028 0.06     0.106 0.20
Proposal - Routine 0.121 0.21 0.120 0.21 -0.009 -0.02     0.015 0.02
Sponsor - Union pension fund 0.254 1.12 0.253 1.12 0.238 1.04     0.232 1.02
Sponsor - Public pension fund 1.002*  1.70 1.007*  1.71 1.119* 1.88     1.094 * 1.82
Sponsor - Investment fund -0.060 -0.08 -0.047 -0.07 0.131 0.19     0.077 0.11
Sponsor - Coordinated investors 0.069 0.18 0.074 0.19 0.197 0.52     0.197 0.51
Sponsor - Socially responsible/religious 0.015 0.03 0.014 0.03 0.009 0.02     0.177 0.38
Log of assets         0.184**  2.32 0.170* 1.91 0.244 ***  2.59
Debt-to-equity         0.008 1.62 0.005 1.25 0.006 1.31
Market-to-book         0.006 0.97 0.006 1.24 0.006 1.15
Prior one-year abnormal stock return         -0.456 -1.59 -0.483* -1.70 -0.485 * -1.68
Prior one-year stock turnover         0.252**  2.26 0.258**  2.37 0.242 **  2.12
Institutional ownership - pressure sensitive         1.292 0.66 1.715 0.93 1.644 0.88
Institutional ownership - pressure insensitive         -0.202 -0.28 -0.194 -0.26 -0.388 -0.51
Entrenchment index             0.309***  3.91 0.252 ***  3.17
Board size             -0.244 -1.39 -0.232 -1.28
Board size squared             0.010 1.45 0.009 1.31
Executive directors             -0.523 -0.45 -1.170 -1.00
Average age of nonexecutive directors             -0.021 -0.50 -0.029 -0.66
Separate chair and CEO             0.108 0.35 0.088 0.28
CEO ownership             -2.253 -0.91 -2.264 -0.90
Stock-based to total CEO compensation             -0.694 -1.62 -0.739 * -1.74
Abnormal CEO compensation             0.081 0.67 0.096 0.80
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings             0.006 0.49 0.005 0.43
 
Table 8: Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and cumulative abnormal returns (continued) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Number of observations 10551  10551  10551  10551  10551 
Number of uncensored observations 1451  1451  1451 1451  1451 
Number of firms 1961  1961  1961  1961  1961 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald χ2 41.56***   41.74***   59.94***   71.76***   87.94***  
Log-likelihood 2628.7  2637.6  2646.3  2645.7  2654.9 
ρ -0.095  -0.220**   -0.170*   -0.091  -0.104 
In the selection equations of Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a shareholder proposal has been submitted and zero otherwise. In the 
outcome equations of Panel B, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the days [-1;+1] surrounding the date that the proxy statement is 
mailed. Market model parameters are estimated over the 200-day period ending 20 days before the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equal-weighted index. The 
firm-level independent variables included in both Panels A and B are described in Appendix A. The proposal-level independent variables in Panel B are dummies 
equal to one if the variable description holds and zero otherwise. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Wald χ2 tests the joint 
significance of the outcome and selection equation pairs. ρ = 0 tests the independence of the outcome and selection equation pairs using a Wald χ2 test. T-statistics 
use standard errors with White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering of observations on each firm. *, ** and *** denote sign ficance 





Appendix A: Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description and source 
Panel A: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Assets ($ millions) The book value of total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Sales ($ millions) The value of total net sales. Source: Compustat. 
Debt-to-equity ratio Total debt divided by the book value of equity. Source: Compustat. 
Market-to-book ratio Market capitalization of equity divided by the book value of equity. Source: Compustat. 
Prior one-year raw stock return The dividend-adjusted stock price return in the year up to two months before the proxy 
mailing date. Source: CRSP. 
Prior one-year abnormal stock return The dividend-adjusted stock price return minus the return on the CRSP equal-weighted 
index, in the year up to two months before the proxy mailing date. Source: CRSP. 
Prior one-year stock turnover The total number of shares sold during the year up to two months before the proxy 
mailing date, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Source: CRSP. 
Institutional ownership The number of shares held by institutions, divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Source: Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum. 
Institutional ownership – 
   pressure sensitive 
The number of shares held by banks and insurance companies, divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding. Source: Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum. 
Institutional ownership – 
   pressure insensitive 
The number of shares held by private and public pension and labor union funds, 
investment funds and their managers, independent investment advisors, and university 
endowments, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Source: Thomson 
Financial CDA/Spectrum. 
Panel B: Governance characteristics 
Governance Index (Max=24) Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index of 24 governance-related charter and bylaw 
provisions. Source: RiskMetrics. 
Entrenchment Index (Max=6) Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) index of six governance-related charter and bylaw 
provisions. Source: RiskMetrics. 
Board size The number of directors on the board of directors. Source: RiskMetrics. 
Executive directors The number of directors employed by the firm, divided by total board size. Source: 
RiskMetrics. 
Average age of nonexecutive 
directors 
The average age of directors not employed by the firm. Source: RiskMetrics. 
Separate chair and CEO A dummy variable equal to one if the chairman of the board and the CEO are different 
persons, and 0 otherwise. Source: RiskMetrics. 
CEO ownership The number of shares held by the CEO divided by total shares outstanding. Source: 
ExecuComp. 
Stock-based to total CEO 
   compensation 
The value of stock options and restricted stock grants, divided by total CEO 
compensation for the individual year. Source: ExecuComp. 
CEO compensation excluding 
   stock option grants ($000s) 
Total CEO compensation for the individual year, including salary, bonus, restricted 
stock, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. Source: ExecuComp. 
Abnormal CEO compensation The natural logarithm of the residual from an annual regression, which regresses the log 
of total CEO compensation excluding stock option grants on the book value of assets and 
industry dummies. Source: ExecuComp. 
Dollar sensitivity of 
   CEO  option holdings 
The dollar value change in the CEO's total option hldings for a $1,000 change in the 
firm’s market value of equity. Source: ExecuComp. 
 
 
Appendix B: Economic effects 
















Panel A: Proposal characteristics 
Times submitted   + 0.860***    
Targeted in previous year     - nss 
Number of proposals in proxy   + 0.417* + -0.299* 
Proposal - Antitakeover   + 39.019***  + 0.565* 
Proposal - Board    8.008***   nss 
Proposal - Voting    19.957***   nss 
Proposal - Compensation    6.616***   nss 
Proposal - Sale of company    nss  nss 
Proposal - Audit    4.569*  nss 
Proposal - Routine    nss  nss 
Sponsor - Union pension fund   + 2.576***  + nss 
Sponsor - Public pension fund   + 6.336***  + 1.094* 
Sponsor - Investment fund   + 10.207**  + nss 
Sponsor - Coordinated investors    nss  nss 
Sponsor - Socially responsible/religious    nss  nss 
Panel B: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Log of assets + 0.592***  - -0.758**  + 0.244***  
Debt-to-equity - -0.030***  - nss - nss 
Market-to-book  nss  nss - nss 
Prior one-year abnormal stock return - -0.224* - nss - -0.485* 
Prior one-year stock turnover + nss + 1.130**  + 0.242**  
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive  -1.815*  nss  nss 
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive + 0.998***  + 11.102***  + nss 
Panel C: Governance characteristics 
Entrenchment index + 0.248***  + 0.908**  + 0.252***  
Board size - -0.237***  - -1.108**  - nss 
Board size squared + 0.007***  + 0.037**  + nss 
Executive directors + nss + nss + nss 
Average age of nonexecutive directors - -0.135***  - nss - nss 
Separate chair and CEO - nss - nss - nss 
CEO ownership - -0.979* - nss - nss 
Stock-based to total CEO compensation - -1.041***  - nss - -0.739* 
Abnormal CEO compensation + nss + nss + nss 
Dollar sensitivity of CEO option holdings + 0.022***  + nss + nss 
This table summarizes the economic effects of proposal and firm characteristics on the voting outcomes as hown in 
Model 5 of Table 7, and on the probability of proposal submissions and the cumulative abnormal returns as shown in 
Model 5 of Tables 8. The variables are described in Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
